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In the Martin and Franklin cases, application of the section to businesses not specifically mentioned in other sections of the ordinance was upheld.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J.,
and Spence, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 21,
1953.

[L. A. No. 22697.

In Bank.

Apr. 28, 1953.]

AI_jlj'RED K. WEISS et al., Appellants, v. STATE BOARD
OF EQUALIZATION et al., Respondents.
[1] Intoxicating Liquors-Licenses-Discretion of Board.-In exercising power which State Board of Equalization has under
Const., art. XX, § 22, to deny, in its discretion, "any specific
liquor license if it shall determine for good cause that the
granting . . . of such license would be contrary to public
welfare or morals," the board performs a quasi judicial function similar to local administrative agencies.
[2] Licenses-Application.-Under appropriate circumstances, the
same rules apply to determination of an application for a
license as those for its revocation.
[3] Intoxicating Liquors- Licenses- Discretion of Board.-The
discretion of the State Board of Equalization to deny or revoke
a liquor license is not absolute but must be exercised in accordance with the law, and the provision that it may revoke or
deny a license "for good cause" necessarily implies that its decision should be based on sufficient evidence and that it should
not act arbitrarily in determining what is contrary to public
welfare or morals.
[4] !d.-Licenses-Discretion of Board.-While the State Board of
Equalization may refuse an on-sale liquor license if the premises are in the immediate vicinity of a school (Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act, § 13), the absence of such a provision
or regulation by the board as to off-sale licenses does not
preclude it from making proximity of the premises to a school
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Alcoholic Beverages, § 25 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Intoxicating Liquors, § 121.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3-7] Intoxicating Liquors, § 9.4; [2]
Licenses, § 32.
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an adequate basis for denying an off~Rale lirlense as being
inimical to public morals and welfare.
[5] !d.-Licenses-Discretion of Board.-It is not unreasonable
for the State Board of Equalization to decide that public
welfare and morals would be jeopardized by the granting of
an off-sale liquor license within 80 feet of some of the buildings on a school ground.
16] !d.-Licenses-Discretion of Board.-Denial of an application
for an off-sale license to sell beer and wine at a store conducting a grocery and delicatessen business across the street from
high school grounds is not arbitrary because there are other
liquor licensees operating in the vicinity of the school, where
all of them, except a drugstore, are at such a distance from
the school that it cannot be said the board acted arbitrarily,
and where, in any event, the mere fact that the board may
have erroneously granted licenses to be used near the school
in the past does not make it mandatory for the board to continue its error and grant any subsequent application.
[7] !d.-Licenses-Discretion of Board.-Denial of an application
for an off-sale license to sell beer and wine at a store across
the street from high school grounds is not arbitrary because
the neighborhood is predominantly Jewish and applicants intend to sell wine to customers of the Jewish faith for sacramental purposes, especially where there is no showing that
wine for this purpose could not be conveniently obtained elsewhere.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. .B'rank G. Swain, ,Judge. Affirmed.
Proceeding in mandamus to compel State Board of Equalization to issue an off-sale liquor license. Judgment denying
writ affirmed.
Riedman & Silverberg and Milton H. Silverberg for Appellants.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Howard S.
Goldin, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondents.
CARTER, J.-Plaintiffs brought mandamus proceedings in
the superior court to review the refusal of defendant, State
Board of Equalization, to issue them an off-sale beer and
wine license at their premises and to compel the issuance of
such a license. 'rhe court gave judgment for the board and
plaintiffs appeal.
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Plaintiffs filed their application with the board for an offsale beer and wine license (a license to sell those beverages
to be consumed elsewhere than on the premises) at their
premises where they conducted a grocery and delicatessen
business. .After a hearing the board denied the application
on the grounds that the issuance of the license would be contrary to the ''public welfare and morals'' because of the
proximity of the premises to a school.
According to the evidence before the board, the area concerned is in l1os Angeles. The school is located in the block
bordered on the south by Rosewood .Avenue, on the west by
Fairfax A venue, and on the north by Melrose A venue-an
80-foot street running east and west parallel to Rosewood and
a block north therefrom. The school grounds are enclosed by
a fence, the gates of which are kept locked most of the time.
Plaintiffs' premises for which the license is sought are west
across Fairfax, an 80-foot street, and on the corner of Fairfax
and Rosewood. The area on the west side of Fairfax, both
north and south from Rosewood, and on the east side of Fairfax south from Rosewood, is a business district. The balance
of the area in the vicinity is residental. The school is a high
school. The portion along Rosewood is an athletic field with
the exception of buildings on the corner of Fairfax and Rosewood across Fairfax from plaintiffs' premises. Those buildings are used for R.O.T.C. The main buildings of the school
are on Fairfax south of Melrose. There are gates along the
Fairfax and Rosewood sides of the school but they are kept
locked most of the time. There are other premises in the
vicinity having liquor licenses. 'l'here are five on the west side
of Fairfax in the block south of Rosewood and one on the east
side of "B'airfax about three-fourths of a block south of Rosewood. North across Melrose and at the corner of Melrose and
Fairfax is a drugstore which has an off-sale license. That
place is 80 feet from the northwest corner of the school property as Melrose is 80 feet wide and plaintiffs' premises are
80 feet from the southwest corner of the school property. It
does not appear when any of the licenses were issued, with
reference to the existence of the school or otherwise. Nor does
it appear what the distance is between the licensed drugstore
and any school buildings as distinguished from school grounds.
'l'he licenses on Fairfax A venue are all farther away from the
school than plaintiffs' premises.
Plaintiffs contend that the action of the board in denying
them a license is arbitrary and unreasonable and they particu-
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larly point to the other licenses now outstanding on premises
as near as or not much farther from the school.
'l'he board has the power ''in its discretion, to deny . . . any
specific liquor license if it shall determine for good cause that
the granting . . . of such license would be contrary to public
welfare or morals." (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 22.) [l] In
exercising that po·wer it performs a quasi judicial function
similar to local administrative agencies. (Covert v. State
Board of EqualizaNon, 29 Cal.2d 125 [173 P.2d 545] ; Reynolds v. State Board of Eqttalization, 29 Cal.2d 137 [173 P.2d
551, 174 P.2d 4] ; Stowmen v. Reilly, 37 Cal.2d 713 [234 P.2d
969].) [2] Under appropriate circumstances, such as we
have here, the same rules apply to the determination of an
application for a license as those for the revoeation of a license.
(Fascination, Inc. v. Hoover, 39 Cal.2d 260 [246 P.2d 656];
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, § 39; Stats. 1935, p. 1123,
as amended.) [3] In making· its decision "The board's discretion . . . however, is not absolute but must be exercised
in accordance with the law, and the provision that it may
revoke [or deny] a licepse 'for good cause' necessarily implies
that its decisions should be based on sufficient evidence and
that it should not act arbitrarily in determining what is contrary to public welfare or morals." (Stournen v. Reilly,
snpra, 37 Cal.2d 713, 717.)
[4] Applying those rules to this case, it is pertinent to
observe that ·while the board may refuse an on-sale license if
the premises are in the immediate vicinity of a school (Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, supra, § 13) there is no such provision or regulation by the board as to off-sale licenses. Nevertheless, proximity of the licensed premises to a school may
supply an adequate basis for denial of a license as being
inimical to public morals and welfare. (See Altadena Comrmmt:ty Church v. State Board of Eqtwlization, 109 Cal.App.2d
99 [240 P.2d 322] ; State v. City of Racine, 220 Wis. 490
[264 N.W. 490]; Ex parte Velasco, (Tex.Civ.App.) 225 S.W.
2d 921; Harrison v. People, 222 Ill. 150 [78 N.E. 52].)
The question is, therefore, whether the board acted arbitrarily in denying the application for the license on the ground
of the proximity of the premises to the school. No question is
raised as to the personal qualifications of the applicants.
[5] \Ve cannot say, however, that it was unreasonable for
the board to decide that public welfare and morals would be
jeopardized by the granting of an off-sale license at premises
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within 80 feet of some of the buildings on a school ground. As
has been seen, a liquor license may be refused when the
premises, where it is to be used, are in the vicinity of a school.
\Vhile there may not be as much probability that an off-sale
license in such a place would be as detrimental as an on-sale
license, yet we believe a reasonable person could conclude that
the sale of any liquor on such premises would adversely affect
the public welfare and morals.
"~
[6] Plaintiffs argue, however, that assuming the foregoing
is true, the action of the board was arbitrary because there
are other liquor licensees operating in the vicinity of the
school. All of them, except the drugstore at the northeast
corner of Fairfax and Melrose, are at such a distance from
the school that we cannot say the board acted arbitrarily. It
should be noted also that as to the drugstore, while it is
within 80 feet of a corner of the school grounds, it does not
appear whether there were any buildings near that corner,
and as to all of the licensees, it does not appear when those
licenses were granted with reference to the establishment of
the school.
Aside from these factors, plaintiffs' argument comes down
to the contention that because the board may have erroneously
granted licenses to be used near the school in the past it must
continue its error and grant plaintiffs' application. That
problem has been discussed: "Not only does due process
permit omission of reasoned administrative opinions but it
probably also perwjts substantial deviation from the principle
of stare de~;Like courts, agencies may overrule prior
dec1sioiis~0r practices and may initiate new policy or law
through adjudication. Perhaps the best authority for this
observation is FCC v. WOKO [329 U.S. 223 (67 S.Ct. 213,
91 L.Ed. 204) .] The Commission denied renewal of a broadcasting license because of misrepresentations made by the
licensee concerning ownership of its capital stock. Before the
rf'Viewing courts one of the principal arguments was that
nomparable deceptions by other licensees had not been dealt
with so severely. A unanimous Supreme Court easily rejected
this argument : 'The mild measures to others and the apparently unannounced change of policy are considerations appropriate for the Commission in determining whether its action
in this case is too drastic, but we cannot say that the Commission is bound by anything that appears before us to deal with
all cases at all times as it has dealt with some that seem com-
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parable.' In rejecting a similar arg·ument that the SEC without warning had changed its policy so as to treat the complainant differently from others in similar circumstances,
Judge Wyzanski said: 'Flexibility was not the least of the
objectives sought by Congress in selecting administrative
rather than judicial determination of the problems of security
regulation . . . . 'l'he administrator is expected to treat experience not as a jailer but as a teacher.' Chief Justice Vinson,
speaking for a Court of Appeals, once declared: 'In the
instant case, it seems to us there has been a departure from
the policy of the Commission expressed in the decided cases,
but this is not a controlling factor upon the Commission.'
Other similar authority is rather abundant. Possibly the
outstanding decision the other way, unless the dissenting opinion in tlJe second Chenery case is regarded as authority, is
NLRB v. Mall rrool Co. [119 F.2d 700.) The Board in ordering back pay for employees wrongfully discharged had in the
court's opinion departed from its usual rule of ordering back
pay only from time of filing charges, when filing of charges
is unreasonably delayed and no mitigating circumstances are
shown. 'l'he Court, assuming unto itself the Board's power
to find facts, said: 'We find in the record no mitigating circumstances justifying the delay.' 'fhen it modified the order
on the ground that 'Consistency in administrative rulings is
essential, for to adopt different standards for similar situations is to act arbitrarily.' From the standpoint of an ideal
system, one can hardly disagree with the court's remark. But
from the standpoint of a workable system, perhaps the courts
should not impose upon the agencies standards of consistency
of action which the courts themselves customarily violate.
Probably deliberate change in or deviation from established
administrative policy should be permitted so long as the action
is not arbitrary or unreasonable. This is the view of most
courts." (Davis, Administrative Law, § 168; see also Parker,
Administrative Law, pp. 250-253; 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, § 148; California Emp. Com. v.
Black-Foxe M. Inst., 43 Cal.App.2d Supp. 868 [110 P.2d
729].) Here the board was not acting arbitrarily if it did
change its position because it may have concluded that another
license would be too many in the vicinity of the school. k:
[7] The contention is also advanced that the neighborhood
is predominantly Jewish and plaintiffs intend to sell wine
to customers of the Jewish faith for sacramental purposes. We
fail to see how that has any bearing on the issue. The wine
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to be sold is an intoxieating beverage, the sale of which requires
a license under the law. Purthermore, it cannot be said that
wine for this purpose could not be conveniently obtained elsewhere.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, ,J., Traynor, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied May 21,
1953.

[L. A. No. 22045.

In Bank.

Apr. 29, 1953.]

ILSE LAHN WEI'l'ZENKORN, Appellant, v. SOL LESSER
et al., Respondents.
[la, lb] Literary Property-Pleading.-A count of a complaint
which alleges that plaintiff wrote and was exclusive owner
of a literary composition, that she had submitted it to defendants at their special request "pursuant to an express oral
understanding and agreement" that, in consideration of such
submission, she would be paid the reasonable value thereof
and given the customary screen credit as author if they should
use all or any part of it, that defendants accepted submission
of the document and retained it in their possession for several months, and that thereafter they produced and exhibited
a motion picture which was patterned on, copied and used
plaintiff's composition to her damage, states a cause of action,
and a judgment of dismissal following an order sustaining
a demurrer thereto without leave to amend will be reversed
with directions to permit defendants to answer.
[2a, 2b] ld.-Pleading.-A count of a complaint which alleges that
plaintiffs furnished to defendants, at their special instance and
request, her literary composition for the purpose of sale to
defendants on payment to her of a reasonable value thereof,
and that defendants accepted such literary composition, retained and used it to her damage, states a cause of action,
and a judgment of dismissal following an order sustaining a
demurrer thereto without leave to amend will be reversed with
directions to permit defendants to answer.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Literary Property; Am.Jur., Literary Property and Copyright, § 112.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-3] Literary Property.

